Fund of the week: Kurma Partners

Fund Snapshot

Overview

Kurma Partners is a Paris-based European healthcare venture capital firm that occupies an unusual position in the biotech investing landscape: it is neither a pure financial investor selecting from existing dealflow, nor a traditional incubator. It is a venture builder that originates companies directly from European academic research, then provides capital across the full lifecycle from company formation through growth equity.

The firm operates three distinct strategies, Kurma Biofund (early-stage therapeutics), Kurma Diagnostics (digital health and diagnostics), and Kurma Growth Opportunities Fund (late-stage venture and growth capital), and reached €1 billion in total assets under management with the final close of Biofund IV at €215 million on 23 April 2026.

Kurma was founded in 2009 by Thierry Laugel, and the team draws on a deep network of European research institutions including the Institut Pasteur, SATT Paris-Saclay, IRB Barcelona, and the Marseille Cancer Research Centre (CRCM). Since 2021 Kurma has been part of the Eurazeo group, the publicly listed Paris-based investment firm, which acquired an initial 70.6% stake in 2021 and the remaining shares in 2024.

Eurazeo manages approximately €39 billion across multiple strategies, with around €4 billion allocated to healthcare across complementary funds.

What distinguishes Kurma from peers like Sofinnova Partners, Forbion, or Jeito Capital is the depth of its company-creation activity. Kurma does not simply lead Series A rounds for existing biotechs. Through its venture-builder arm Argobio Studio, co-founded with Bpifrance and supported by strategic investors Angelini Ventures, Evotec, and Institut Pasteur, Kurma is involved in company formation from the earliest scientific validation stage.

Argobio has invested in eight companies to date, three of which (Elkedonia, Laigo Bio, Enodia Therapeutics) have completed initial funding rounds. Roughly 80% of Biofund IV is reserved for therapeutic companies, and up to half of investments will go to companies created by Kurma or Argobio, a remarkable proportion for a venture fund of this size.

Investment Thesis

Kurma's thesis rests on three propositions specific to European life sciences.

European academic excellence is consistently underexploited as a venture commercialisation engine. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom together produce a flow of breakthrough biology research that has historically been licensed to US biotech for commercialisation. Kurma's premise is that this gap can be closed by Europe-based investors with the operational capacity to translate academic findings into globally competitive companies, rather than handing this value capture to US crossover funds.

The Biofund III exit list (Amolyt out of CHU Saint-Etienne, Emergence Therapeutics out of CRCM Marseille, ImCheck out of Aix-Marseille University) supports the thesis: world-class science from European institutions, built into companies acquired by major pharma at scale.

Company creation generates more value than fund-of-funds investing alone. Where most VCs source from existing dealflow, Kurma allocates a meaningful share of each fund to ex-nihilo company formation. This is operationally expensive but provides Kurma early ownership at lower entry valuations and stronger governance positions on the cap table.

The firm explicitly leverages its team of biotechnology professionals to "de-risk execution" before bringing in syndicate co-investors at Series A, an approach that mirrors the Flagship Pioneering model on a smaller, European, and externally syndicated scale.

Capital follows the company across the lifecycle. Through the Kurma Growth Opportunities Fund, Kurma can support its best portfolio companies into late-stage rounds rather than diluting early stakes. The €84 million Nuclidium Series B led by Kurma Growth Opportunities in July 2025, and the dual-fund participation in ImCheck (Biofund II plus Kurma Growth, prior to the €1 billion Ipsen exit), demonstrate the playbook. Rémi Droller, Managing Partner, has been explicit about this strategy in publicly addressing the European biotech capital gap: where Series B and C rounds historically depended on US crossover funds, Kurma aims to provide European capital all the way through to clinical proof of concept and commercial readiness.

The firm describes itself as "thematically agnostic" within therapeutics, with Biofund IV invested across autoimmune disease, cancer immunotherapy, gene editing, oncology ADCs, radiopharmaceuticals, RNA therapeutics, and rare diseases. The Diagnostics franchise covers digital therapies, AI-driven imaging, and companion diagnostics.

Royalty and Milestone Exposure

Kurma does not operate a pharmaceutical royalty acquisition programme of the type run by Royalty Pharma, HealthCare Royalty Partners, OMERS Life Sciences, or Oberland Capital. It does not buy existing royalty streams from biopharma counterparties, write synthetic royalty financings, or run a structured credit book.

Kurma's royalty exposure is structural rather than strategic, arising indirectly through the deal structures of pharma trade sales. When a Kurma portfolio company is acquired by a strategic, the consideration typically includes deferred milestone payments and, in some cases, sales-based royalty entitlements that flow back to the Kurma funds and ultimately to LPs. The Biofund III exit table illustrates the pattern.

The pattern matters because Kurma's headline IRR is partially front-loaded at exit but the residual milestone tail can extend cash distributions to LPs over five to ten years post-acquisition. For Amolyt specifically, the $250 million contingent payment is tied to a single specified regulatory milestone for eneboparatide (AZP-3601) in hypoparathyroidism, which is in Phase III development under AstraZeneca's Alexion rare disease unit. For ImCheck, the structure is more granular, with deferred payments tied to the regulatory progression and commercial sales of ICT01 in first-line acute myeloid leukaemia.

The deal closed in December 2025 ahead of original Q1 2026 guidance, and the ICT01 programme is now executing its Phase I/II EVICTION trial under Ipsen's oncology unit. These tail entitlements give Kurma's LPs continued upside on assets that have technically already been "exited" from the cap table.

For royalty market participants, the relevance of Kurma is therefore upstream rather than parallel. Kurma builds the companies whose products eventually generate royalty streams that royalty investors may purchase from larger pharma counterparties. The Crysvita-style royalty positions held by OMERS or the synthetic royalties acquired by Royalty Pharma sit downstream of the company-creation and clinical-development activities that Kurma underwrites.

Several of Kurma's current Biofund IV companies (Adcytherix, Nuclidium, SciRhom, Memo Therapeutics) could plausibly become royalty financing counterparties three to five years out, either through pharma licensing deals or through synthetic royalty structures of the type increasingly common at clinical proof-of-concept stage.

Fund Structure and Limited Partners

Biofund IV (Therapeutics, €215 million, final close 23 April 2026)

The fund's first close in October 2024 reached €140 million against a €250 million target. The final close at €215 million represents a 35% increase over Biofund III (€160 million) but a 14% miss against the original target, a meaningful detail. Kurma raised in a tightening LP environment for European specialist biotech funds.

The 11 investments already made from the fund as of April 2026 leave roughly nine more allocations for the remaining lifetime, suggesting average ticket sizes of approximately €10 million per company.

Kurma Diagnostics 2 (KDx2, €83 million, closed December 2021)

KDx2 invests minority stakes in European companies developing digital therapies, advanced diagnostic tools, and connected medical devices. Its predecessor (KDx1) backed companies including Stilla Technologies (acquired by Bio-Rad in 2025), PathoQuest (acquired by Charles River Laboratories in January 2026), and Raidium (3D medical imaging foundation models).

KDx2 LPs include the European Investment Fund (with InnovFin Equity and the European Guarantee Fund support), Bpifrance via Fonds national d'amorçage 2, BNP Paribas, and three Belgian funds.

Kurma Growth Opportunities Fund

This fund targets companies past clinical proof-of-concept (Phase 1B or 2A) for biopharma, or commercial readiness for diagnostics. It led the €84 million NUCLIDIUM Series B in July 2025 and co-invested in IO Biotech, Shorla Oncology, and other late-stage names.

The fund also captured upside on the Amolyt exit alongside Biofund III, demonstrating the cross-fund value-capture model. Belgian Growth Fund commitments indicate a target of around €250 million.

Argobio Studio

Argobio is a venture builder rather than a fund per se. It is co-founded with Bpifrance and supported by strategic investors Angelini Ventures, Evotec, and Institut Pasteur. Eight portfolio companies have been incubated to date, with three (Elkedonia, Laigo Bio, Enodia Therapeutics) having completed initial financing rounds. Argobio's role is operational, embedding teams to validate science and build companies from the earliest stage before institutional Series A rounds.

Selected Portfolio (April 2026)

This is a partial list. Kurma's full portfolio across all funds includes approximately 60 active companies, with a meaningful share held in Diagnostics and digital health companies not detailed above. PitchBook lists 153 total investments and 37 exits across the firm's history.

Leadership Team

The team operates with approximately 28 people including 12 partners, materially smaller than Sofinnova Partners or Forbion but consistent with Kurma's selective approach. Offices in Paris and Munich provide French and German biotech ecosystem depth, with the Paris office leading therapeutics origination and the Munich office focusing on the German Mittelstand of academic spinouts (SciRhom, EvlaBio, Memo Therapeutics' German links).

Strategic Differentiators

Academic origination at scale. Kurma's network with Institut Pasteur, the SATT regional tech transfer offices, IRB Barcelona, CRCM Marseille, and other European research centres provides a structural origination advantage that fund-of-funds investors and US-headquartered VCs cannot easily replicate. Daniel Olive (CRCM Marseille) co-founded both ImCheck and Emergence Therapeutics with Kurma, illustrating the depth of single-relationship value extraction.

Eurazeo integration without Eurazeo dependence. As an Eurazeo group company, Kurma has access to LP capital and brand reach while operating with independent investment committee authority. This is materially different from being a captive corporate VC. Eurazeo participates as an LP in Biofund IV alongside external cornerstone investors but does not direct deal selection.

Company creation discipline. The fact that up to half of Biofund IV will be invested in companies created by Kurma or Argobio is unusual at the fund's scale. Most European biotech VCs talk about company creation but execute primarily through Series A leads on existing companies. Kurma's dedicated Argobio infrastructure suggests a more durable commitment.

Cross-fund continuity. The Amolyt exit captured value across both Biofund III and Kurma Growth Opportunities. The ImCheck exit captured value across Biofund II and Kurma Growth. This compounds the firm's ability to follow winners and reduces the dilution that Series B and Series C rounds typically impose on early-stage venture funds.

CSL as anchor strategic LP. Australian biopharma CSL committed as a cornerstone LP across multiple Kurma vehicles. CSL is one of the world's largest plasma fractionation and rare disease companies and provides Kurma with commercial validation, rare disease therapeutic area expertise, and a potential downstream acquirer for late-stage rare disease assets. This is qualitatively different from a passive financial LP.

Blue Team Perspective

The optimist's view of Kurma is that the firm has built a durable, hard-to-replicate position in the European biotech ecosystem at exactly the moment when European life sciences is gaining momentum.

The Biofund III exit track record speaks for itself: four major exits (Amolyt, Emergence, Corlieve, ImCheck) from a single €160 million fund, with combined headline transaction values exceeding €3 billion across upfront and contingent payments. Even with the milestone tails not yet realised, the gross multiple on invested capital from Biofund III is likely to be one of the strongest among European biotech VCs of the 2018-2020 vintage.

The Adcytherix Series A in October 2025 (€105 million, the largest ADC-focused Series A in Europe in 2025) demonstrates Kurma's ability to lead globally relevant rounds in competitive segments. The Adcytherix founding team had previously built Emergence Therapeutics (sold to Lilly), and Kurma backed them again in Adcytherix, illustrating the network effect that compounds with successful exits.

The presence of co-investors including Bpifrance, Andera Partners, Angelini Ventures, Surveyor Capital (Citadel), aMoon, RA Capital, and KKR-controlled DawnBiopharma in the same Series A is a meaningful endorsement of Kurma's deal selection.

The radiopharmaceutical bet through Nuclidium is well-timed. Copper-61/Copper-67 theranostics sit at the intersection of diagnostic imaging and targeted therapy, a market that has seen Eli Lilly's $1.4 billion Point Biopharma acquisition and Bristol Myers Squibb's $4.1 billion RayzeBio acquisition validate radiopharma as a strategic priority. Nuclidium's copper-based platform is differentiated from the lutetium-based incumbents, addressing a specific supply constraint that has limited radioligand therapy access globally.

The Eurazeo backing is a long-term strategic asset rather than a constraint. Eurazeo's €4 billion healthcare allocation across multiple complementary funds provides Kurma with downstream growth capital, M&A optionality, and brand permanence in a market where smaller European biotech VCs have been absorbed or wound down over 2023-2025.

The Argobio venture builder model is particularly well-positioned for the current moment. As US crossover funds have retrenched and Series B rounds for European biotech have become harder to close on US-led terms, the value of Europe-based capital that can support a company from inception through Series C has never been higher.

Kurma's structural ability to act as a one-firm syndicate across €1 billion of AUM differentiates it from peer VCs that depend on US co-investors to close growth rounds.

The Pharvaris and Vico Therapeutics positions provide additional upside optionality. Pharvaris is in late-stage development for hereditary angioedema with a synthetic royalty deal precedent (BioCryst's ORLADEYO synthetic royalty held by OMERS) suggesting clear non-dilutive financing options if needed. Vico is in Phase 1/2a for spinocerebellar ataxia and Huntington's disease, both rare neurodegenerative indications with high unmet need and pharma acquisition appetite.

Red Team Perspective

The skeptic's view is that Kurma's recent fundraise tells a story of constrained ambition, that the firm faces structural questions about the company-creation model, and that the European biotech market dynamics it depends on are not as favourable as the headline numbers suggest.

Biofund IV closed at €215 million against an original €250 million target, a 14% miss. In a stronger LP environment, a firm with Kurma's exit track record would have been able to upsize, not undersize, its newest fund. The fact that the fund came in below target despite four high-profile Biofund III exits and despite the strong post-2024 biotech M&A rebound is a cautionary signal.

European LPs remain cautious on specialist biotech allocation, and a fund that should have benefited from a strong tailwind instead reflects ongoing tightness.

The company-creation model is operationally expensive and scales sub-linearly. Argobio has incubated only eight companies since launch, three of which have completed first financing rounds. By comparison, Flagship Pioneering creates 8 to 10 ProtoCos per year and 100+ companies cumulatively. Kurma does not, and arguably cannot at €1 billion AUM, replicate the Flagship throughput. The advantage of company creation comes with a built-in capacity constraint that limits fund size and ultimately LP capacity.

Concentration risk is meaningful. Kurma's exit track record is heavily front-loaded by Amolyt ($1.05 billion AstraZeneca) and ImCheck (€1.0 billion Ipsen). Both are oncology and rare disease bets. If pharma M&A appetite for these specific therapeutic areas softens, or if regulatory or commercial milestones in either of the back-end consideration structures fail to trigger, the realised return on Biofund III will be materially lower than the headline numbers suggest.

The €250 million Amolyt regulatory milestone for eneboparatide is contingent on a specific approval that has not yet occurred.

The radiopharmaceutical bet is timed alongside an increasingly crowded competitive field. Nuclidium's Copper-61/Copper-67 platform competes against Lilly's Point Biopharma assets, BMS's RayzeBio, Novartis's Pluvicto franchise, Lantheus's Pylarify and emerging radiopharma pipeline, and a wave of newer entrants. Differentiation on the isotope itself (copper rather than lutetium or actinium) does not guarantee differentiation on clinical outcomes or commercial uptake.

ADC competition is severe. Adcytherix is one of dozens of ADC companies globally, including well-funded peers such as Tubulis (€308M Series C in 2025), LegoChem Biosciences / Ligachem, Mythic Therapeutics, Avenzo Therapeutics, and the in-house ADC programmes of every major pharma. The ADC payload differentiation thesis (moving beyond tubulin and topoisomerase inhibitors) is shared by multiple competitors.

Eurazeo ownership creates a long-term strategic question. Eurazeo's full ownership of Kurma since 2024 means Kurma is no longer an independent firm but a subsidiary of a publicly listed parent. While operational independence is preserved on paper, the strategic optionality of the firm (whether to raise larger funds, expand geographically, or eventually spin out) is now subject to Eurazeo group capital allocation decisions rather than Kurma management's standalone judgement. For LPs evaluating Biofund V or beyond, this is a non-trivial governance consideration.

The European biotech IPO window is narrow and selective. The Vico, Coave, and SciRhom positions all need exit pathways within the lifetimes of their respective funds. With European biotech IPO activity remaining muted relative to US comparators, exit liquidity depends overwhelmingly on pharma M&A.

This concentrates exit risk in the dealmaking appetite of a small set of strategic acquirers, several of whom face their own patent cliffs and pipeline pressures that may make them more selective rather than more aggressive.

Finally, the firm's growth equity strategy through Kurma Growth Opportunities Fund is competing in an increasingly crowded late-stage European biotech segment. EQT Life Sciences, Forbion Growth, Sofinnova Partners' Crossover funds, and US crossover funds returning selectively to Europe all compete for the same Phase 2 and Phase 3 European biotech rounds. Kurma's relatively smaller fund size in this segment may constrain its ability to lead the largest growth rounds against better-capitalised peers.

2026 Context and Recent Developments

23 April 2026. Biofund IV final close announced at €215 million. Total Kurma AUM reaches €1 billion across all franchises. CSL, EIF, and Bpifrance confirmed as cornerstone LPs. Eleven portfolio investments completed, target of approximately twenty.

March 2026. Laigo Bio final close of €17 million seed financing announced, with €4 million from new co-lead Biovance Capital and €1.5 million from Kurma added to the round originally closed in December 2025. Argobio-incubated company.

February 2026. Stilla Technologies acquisition by Bio-Rad announced at $225 million plus up to $50 million contingent milestones. Diagnostics franchise exit through KDx1.

January 2026. PathoQuest acquired by Charles River Laboratories. Kurma was a long-term Diagnostics franchise investor; PathoQuest's iDTECT NGS-based viral safety platform is now part of CRL's biologics testing portfolio.

December 2025. ImCheck Therapeutics acquisition by Ipsen completes ahead of original Q1 2026 guidance. €350M upfront, up to €1B total. Closes the loop on a Biofund II / Kurma Growth Opportunities cross-fund position.

October 2025. Adcytherix €105 million Series A closes, co-led by Kurma, Bpifrance, Andera Partners, and Angelini Ventures. Largest ADC Series A in Europe in 2025. Step Pharma €38 million Series C.

July 2025. Nuclidium €84 million Series B closes, led by Kurma Growth Opportunities Fund.

Earlier 2025. Brink Therapeutics seed (€3.5M, Kurma lead). Avidicure $50M seed launch (Kurma participation, EQT Life Sciences lead).

The cadence of 2025-2026 deal announcements is roughly consistent with Kurma's stated pace of approximately 8-10 new investments per year across all funds, plus follow-on financings and exits.

Conclusion

Kurma Partners occupies a particular niche in the European biotech ecosystem: a venture builder rather than a pure financial investor, operationally embedded in the academic-to-industrial translation pathway, and structurally positioned across the company lifecycle through three complementary funds and a venture-builder partnership.

The firm has built one of the more credible European biotech franchises of the past fifteen years. The four-exit Biofund III track record (Amolyt, Emergence, Corlieve, ImCheck), totalling more than €3 billion in headline transaction value, validates the company-creation model in a way that few European peers can match.

The €1 billion total AUM milestone, achieved with the Biofund IV close on 23 April 2026, marks a transition from boutique to mid-scale European biotech specialist.

The royalty market interaction is structural rather than direct. Kurma does not buy royalty streams. Instead, it builds the companies whose products, once acquired by major pharma, generate the royalty obligations that royalty investors later acquire.

Several of the Biofund IV companies, particularly Adcytherix and Nuclidium, are plausible counterparties for synthetic royalty financings or pharma-licensing-driven royalty stack creation in the 2027-2029 window as their lead programmes reach clinical proof of concept.

The questions facing Kurma as it moves through Biofund IV deployment are whether it can sustain the Biofund III hit rate against materially greater competition in European biotech, whether the Eurazeo ownership structure proves to be an enabler or a constraint on long-term ambition, and whether the European biotech exit environment continues to support the M&A-led liquidity model on which the firm depends.

For European life science founders, Kurma represents one of the most operationally engaged Europe-based capital sources available, with a demonstrated willingness to back teams through multiple rounds and across multiple funds. For pharma BD teams, the Kurma portfolio is a curated funnel of clinical-stage European assets that have been built specifically with pharma acquisition or licensing in mind.

For royalty market participants, Kurma is not a direct competitor but a meaningful source of upstream company creation activity that ultimately feeds royalty-eligible products into the broader pharmaceutical financing ecosystem.

All information in this article was accurate as of the research date and is derived from publicly available sources including company press releases, regulatory announcements, and financial news reporting. Information may have changed since publication. This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, or financial advice. The author is not a lawyer or financial adviser.